University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 14
Number 1 Fall, 1983

Article 5

1983

Point/Counterpoint: Lawyer Advertising - We Will
Hand You No Line before Its Time
John A. Lynch Jr.
University of Baltimore School of Law, jlynch@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Lynch, John A. Jr. (1983) "Point/Counterpoint: Lawyer Advertising - We Will Hand You No Line before Its Time," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 14: No. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol14/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

10

POINT/COUNTERPOINT

LAWYER ADVERTISING
We Will Hand You No Line Before Its Time

John A. Lynch, Jr. *
Frankly my dear, I don't like it! All of
that lawyer advertising. Perhaps the lawyers are not completely to blame. After
Congress banned cigarette advertising in
the electronic media,1 it was perhaps inevitable that the electronic media would
turn to hemorrhoidal remedies, feminine
hygiene products, veg-o-matics and finally to lawyers for their advertising revenue.
Whatever the cause, the good citizens
of Baltimore have been subjected to a
barrage of execrable television advertising by lawyers. First and foremost, there
is that bearded fellow who often has sirens in the background and who advises
us to drive carefully on holiday weekends.
(To drive, perchance to crash, aye, there's
the rub).2 Then there are those gentlemen who want to help us across the board
of "The Game of Law." How Baltic Avenue!
Let us not forget the former football behemoth who, mercifully, does not confuse
his commercials by referring to his counsellor as "everything you ever wanted in
a lawyer-and less."
Of course, the blight is not confined to
television. Tear sheets now appear on
M.TA buses for the convenience of passengers. And remember, "If you've got a
phone, you've got a lawyer!"

Lawyer Advertising: Why it
was prohibited, why it is
permitted and why it is done.
Perhaps the best thing that may be said
about lawyer advertising is that, unlike
acid rain or the gypsy moth, it can be
stopped at the border. Last year the Supreme Court of Canada, in Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of British
Columbia,3 upheld the right of a provincial
bar to prohibit lawyer advertiSing. The advertising involved in the disciplinary proceedings against the attorney was tame
indeed. The lawyer's newpaper advertisement, in addition to listing the prices
of certain services and his office hours,
recited the following:

DONALD E. JABOUR
Barrister & Solicitor wishes to announce the opening of a new concept of law office
LEGAL SERVICES AT PRICES
MIDDLE INCOME FAMILIES
CAN AFFORD
Buying or selling a home. Writing a
Will. Motor vehicle accidents or offenses. Landlord/tenant problems.
Family matters. Incorporations. Estates. Court appearances.
These are the kinds of situations
where middle income families need
legal assistance. Now it is available
at moderate costs with pre-set fees
for many services. 4
Prior to the interlocutory appeals, the provincial bar had recommended suspension of the attorney for six months.s While
the Canadian decision may indicate in an
abstract way that the prohibition of lawyer
advertising is not inherently incongruous
in a western democracy with a tradition
of free speech, our own Supreme Court,
in the landmark decision of Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona,6 saw the matter differently. The Canadian court implied that it,
too, would have been unable to uphold a
prohibition of lawyer advertising if the Canadian right to free speech were "entrenched beyond the reach of Parliament
or legislature, as has been done for example in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution."7
The author is not alone in finding most
lawyer advertising noisome, crass and
undignified. The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held:
We are not prepared to reject these
time-honored traditions. The law is
an ancient, honorable and learned
profession and its practitioners are
not tradesmen in the marketplace.
The role of the huckster, the hawkster and the peddler ill becomes a
member of a dignified profession. s
The Supreme Court in Bates held, ap-

propriately, that the interest of maintaining the dignity of the legal profession pales
beside the First Amendment interests,
even as to legal advertising which involves merely commercial rather than
political or association overtones. 9 The
Court held: "The listener's interest is
substantial: the consumer's concern for
the free flow of commercial speech often
may be far keener than his concern for
urgent political dialogue."1o The Court
hinted that the bar's failure to advertise
has hurt its image,11 and that resistance
to advertiSing in the past appears to have
stemmed from a stuffed-shirt sentiment
that advertising would benefit only the
wrong sorts of lawyers and clients. Perhaps the classic example of this stuffedshirt mentality was expressed by Henry
Drinker in his classic work on professional
ethics:
While extensive advertising would
doubtlessly increase litigation, this has
always been considered as against
public policy. Also, many of the most
desirable clients, imbued with high
respect for their lawyer and his calling, would have no use for a lawyer
who does not maintain the dignity and
standards of his profession and would
instinctively resent any attempt by
another lawyer to encroach on their
relation (emphasis added).12
There was perhaps a feeling that most of
the good clients were already taken and
that those who were not could find counsel at their country clubs, thank you. Such
pomposity was largely punctured by Bates.
Reading Bates, one might get the
impression that lawyer advertising is
somehow in the public interest because
it provides consumers with valuable information and takes the mystique out of
choosing a lawyer. One can imagine that,
for many persons, choosing a lawyer for
the first time and being too embarrassed
to ask when the "meter" will start to run
is reminiscent of the scene in the "Summer of '42" in which the teenage boy in
the drugstore tries to buy contraceptives
for the first time.
In addition to holding that lawyer advertising might do some good, the Court
in Bates also held that: lawyer advertising was not inherently misleading; it would
not adversely affect the administration of
justice by stirring up litigation; it would not
have an adverse effect on the price and
quality of legal services; and deceptive
advertising was preventable.
At bottom, however, advertising usually does not stem from humanitarian motivations. The decision to advertise is an
economic one. 13 A lawyer who advertises
will want to do so effectively-in a manner which brings clients into his office.
Such a lawyer will be motivated to ad-
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vertise in a manner calculated to make
the public remember his or her name when
the services of a lawyer become necessary. If advertising of products and other
services is any indication, the slick and
the .c~ever will predominate in legal advertising. If legal advertising on television
is any indication, perhaps that day may
not come too soon in the Baltimore area.
But. s.logans which constitute good advertising may not constitute good reasons
for choosing a lawyer.
Perhaps recognizing this, the Supreme
Court in Bates sharply limited the types
of services, the advertising of which is
afforded First Amendment protection:
The only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine
ones: the uncontested divorce, the
simple adoption, the uncontested
personal bankruptcy, the change of
name and the like .... 14
Often such services do not "pay" unless
performed in a setting which emphasizes
mass-production and de-emphasizes
lawyer-client contact. Such cases do not
generally comprise the sort of practice
that would motivate a person to go to law
school; they are often the kinds of cases
for which a law school graduate settles.
The bar is stuffed to the gunwales with
lawyers, many of whom must look to the
other side of the tracks for clients. Bates

clearly indicates the side of the tracks for
which lawyer advertising is intended.

Maryland Regulation of
Lawyer Advertising
Like it or not, lawyer adve1ising is constitutionally protected and is here to stay.
Not all lawyers will advertise, and most
who do will do so in a dignified and restrained fashion in the print media. Recognizing that the legal profession, like all
others, has its share of (to put it delicately) sleazebags, the Supreme Court
(not putting it exactly that way), held that
the states may regulate lawyer advertising.15 The Court held in Bates that misstatements tolerated in other commercial
a~vertising "may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising."16 Thus, in legal advertising, Joe Namath really does
have to wear the panty hose. Quality-ofservice claims ("You always get your way
at Budd and Beaujolais"), in-person solicitation and electronic-media advertising
were areas singled out by the Court as
appropriate subjects for restrictions.
In response to Bates, the American Bar
Association, in 1980, adopted a Model
Code of Professional Responsibility which
permits advertising in print media and on
radio and television. 17 The Model Code
requires that the advertiSing be done in
a "dignified manner."18 The Code lists
twenty-five types of information which may

be pr?vided in the advertisement, most
of which. relate to biographical data, type
of practice, and the terms upon which
servi~e~ ~ill be provided. 19 With respect
to soliCitatIOn as a form of advertisement
or promotion, the Code, with limited exceptions, generally prohibits a lawyer from
recommending his services to someone
who has not sought his advice or from
compensating anyone who has recommended his employment to another. 20
While Maryland has adopted limitations on solicitation of clients which are
virtually identical to those of the ABA Model
Code,21 it has avoided the Model Code's
specificity as to the manner and content
of lawyer advertising. The Maryland Code
of Professional Responsibility provides
very simply that lawyer advertising shall
not be deceptive or misleading. 22 Maryland wisely eschewed the Model Code's
cookbook approach to regulation of lawyer advertising. Even though the Supreme Court purported to sanction some
~egulation of lawyer advertising in Bates,
It and other federal courts have struck
down several state regulations since
Bates. 23 It is probably impossible to define "routine" legal services, and Maryland has wisely avoided doing so. Even
if legal services billed at fees exceeding
$100 per hour may ever be called "routine," clients who can afford to pay such
fees would not be attracted by television
antics or neon signs. Lawyers capable of
performing such services will not advertise. Not all states have left the choice of
advertising methods to the judgment of
lawyers. For instance, New Jersey prohibits advertising on television. 24 Utah, ever
the party-pooper, has proscribed the use
of promotional items such as matchbooks
and inscribed pens and pencils. 25 Maryland'~ sole focus in regulating lawyer advertising IS the prevention of misleading
the public. While this goal is commendable, Maryland's failure to regulate in any
way the methods or the tone of advertising may be contrary to the interests of the
public and of the bar. One can only hope
that members of the bar will have the good
sense not to use "sandwich-men," celebrity clients, or the bosoms of Baltimore
Street dancers to market their services.
If any member does, and the advertising
is not deceptive or misleading, there is
nothing to stop him.26 Before discussing
the problems which excesses in advertising may cause for the public and the
bar, it would be useful to examine Maryland's regulation of solicitation and advertising.

Solicitation
In-person solicitation presents the opportunity for the most egregious overreaching of members of the public by law-
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yers. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,27 has
permitted the states to proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Ohralik's wretched factual situation (which included a hospital visit, the "signing up"
of clients with adverse interests, and surreptitious taping of the clients from under
a rain coat) amply illustrates the justification for curbing such solicitation, and
Maryland wisely does so. Regulation of
solicitation is relevant to advertising because carefully targeted mailed or handdistributed advertisements may be virtually indistinguishable from informing a
stranger that he has a legal problem and
volunteering to represent him. The latter
is not permissible under the Maryland
Code of Professional Responsibility.28 Although the Maryland rule against solicitation specifically provides that it does not
preclude commercial advertising which is
otherwise permissible,29 Maryland is quite
likely to restrict written solicitation of individuals under the guise of advertising.
Courts in other states have grappled
with the problem of carefully targeted advertising. In Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n,30
the Court of Appeals of New York, holding
that the invasion of privacy and overbearing persuasion of in-person solicitation were not present, permitted direct mail
solicitation of clients. Nevertheless, because of potential conflicts of interest, the
same court, in Greene v. Grievance
Committee,31 later upheld prohibition of
such solicitation through third parties.
Cogently, the Supreme Court of Florida
recognized the obvious in prohibiting direct mail solicitation:
We do not perceive that a citizen receiving a letter written on stationery
carrying an attorney's letterhead
wou[d be bold enough to discard it
after only a casual perusal. Read it
he must, for letters from attorneys
carry a special aura of respect because of the state's power that attorneys can invoke. 32
Although the prohibition was subsequently vacated, the principle remains
correct. A written "advertisement," targeted to a susceptible individual who has
not expressed a desire to retain the attorney who has issued the advertisement,
possesses the potential for overreaching
the addressee.
The Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Association has addressed the problems of solicitation
through advertising in several informal
opinions. In a lengthy informal opinion,
the committee has recognized that mailed
communications present the possibility for
abuse. 33 Nevertheless, the opinion permits mailing to individuals and organizations "chosen on the basis of geo-

graphic or demographic characteristics"
or to groups of people whose characteristics suggest that they may be likely to
need certain broad categories of legal
services. 34 An earlier informal opinion,
however, held that lawyers could not pass
out their own brochures door-to-door.35
Opinion 81-21 states that lawyers may
hand out their own brochures as long as
they state that the brochures are informational only. The Committee has held
that a prepaid legal services program may
not use a paid salesperson.36In two opinions which are difficult to reconcile, the
Committee held that a lawyer admitted in
Maryland and a neighboring jurisdiction
could not mail solicitations to Maryland
residents charged with traffic violations in
the neighboring jurisdiction,37 but that another lawyer could send residents of a
housing development which was being
converted to condominiums a letter informing them that he does real estate
closings.38 Although the Committee held
that it was not improper for a law firm, on
the reverse side of its business card, to
disperse advice in the area of workers'
compensation law, it suggested that the
firm might be precluded from representing persons who received such advice. 39
Unfortunately, it is possible that Maryland lawyers generally will not have a clear
idea as to what sort of advertising or promotion constitutes impermissible solicitation until specific disciplinary proceedings reach the courts. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognize that artfully targeted mailings may possess the potential
for the unfair exertion of an attorney's position over the public which, after all, is
what the prohibition against solicitation is
designed to prevent.

Misleading and Deceptive Advertising
As indicated earlier, Bates permits closer
scrutinizing of the truth of claims in legal
advertising than in advertising generally.
On at least two occasions, the Committee
on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar Association has indicated that this will be
the rule in Maryland. 40 Auto makers and
the producers of products, such as Geritol, have experienced counsel, trade associations and many years of court and
regulatory battles to tell them what is misleading in their contexts. Lawyers are
simply told that they must be more Catholic than the Pope about their advertising
claims.
A few legal truth-in-advertising cases
have reached the courts and perhaps they
provide some guidance for would-be lawyer advertisers. In Eaton v. Supreme Court
of Arkansas,41 the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the issuance of a private
reprimand to a lawyer who had placed an
advertisement in a mailed package which
included, inter alia, a "coupon for french

fries with the purchase of a hamburger
... a discount from a 'Figure Salon and
Health Spa' on a one month membership
... [and] a special on seamless guttering."42 Although the lawyer's advertisement offered no discount, the envelope
read:
VALUABLE COUPONS from
local businesses
Save! Save! Save!
USE THESE 43
The court regarded the advertisement as
misleading and uninformative.
In Roemer v. Albany County Bar
Ass'n. ,44 the lawyers advertised that they
provided a wide range of legal services
at one-third to one-half less than the current rates for legal fees in Albany County.
The problem was that there were no such
ascertainable "current" rates for legal.
services. The court held that no action
should be taken against the lawyers because they were ignorant of the contents
of the circular. Presumably, such a defense would be unavailing in Maryland. 45
In Zimmerman v. Office of Grievance
Committees,46 the court ordered censure
of an attorney because of his advertising.
The Yellow Pages of his local telephone
directory divided the practice of law into
twenty-five areas. He had himself listed
in all twenty-five, although he had had no
experience in several areas. In exotic
specialties such as admiralty, antitrust and
trade regulation, immigration and naturalization, juvenile law, labor law, securities law and taxation, he was the only
lawyer listed. Further, the lawyer had
himself listed under his first name, Aaron,
rather than his last name, Zimmerman,
which caused him to be listed first in every
category. The court refused to accept the
lawyer's explanation that he was associated with a firm, the members of which
could assist him in all of his purported
areas of practice, since the lawyer was
holding himself out to the public and not
the firm.
In State ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n.
v. Schaffer,47 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma dismissed a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer who advertised that
he would file court papers or otherwise
begin the performance of legal services
on behalf of clients within five days of the
initial conference or such services would
be performed at no charge. The court held:
The state surely has no demonstrable interest in suppressing delivery
of free legal service or in discouraging expeditious lawyer performance. 48
As with the question of solicitation, the
Maryland Bar has grappled with the issue

13
of truth in advertising informally for the
most part.49 The Committee on Ethics has
tentatively concluded that the listing of a
lawyer in a directory intended for circulation entitled The Best Lawyers in America is "likely to be misleading," but that a
lawyer does not run afoul of DR 2-101
as long as he or she does not actively
participate in having his or her name
listed. 50 The Committee held that advertising oneself as "First on the Maryland
Bar Exam" could conceivably be misleading in the absence of a date of the
examination 51 and that advertising at all
in the county telephone directory might
be misleading if the attorney does not have
a regular office in that county.52
A recurrent question with respect to truth
in advertising is the extent to which one
may advertise the specific areas of the
law in which he practices. It would not be
unreasonable for a member of the public
to regard such advertising as a claim to
a specialty, and for the most part, the bar
has no means of certifying specialists. It
appears that the Committee on Ethics
would not regard as misleading an advertisement that one practices more frequently in one or more areas of the law.53
It also appears that use of the term "specialist" would not be proscribed if one could
demonstrate that the designation is truthful. 54
It is very clear that lawyers must examine the contents and context of their
advertising. Maryland's Code of Professional Responsibility gives them little room
for error; after all, lawyers are neophytes
in the world of advertising.

Special Problems of
Advertising for the Legal
Profession
Legal advertising poses two distinct
challenges to the legal profession: preserving the nature of the attorney/client
relationship, and preserving respect for
the administration of justice.

The Attorney/Client Relationship
The advent of lawyer advertising means
that an individual can choose his lawyer
the same way he chooses his toothpaste.
The individual is no longer limited to selecting a fellow club or church member,
lodge brother or second cousin. He may
select someone who has simply caught
his attention, a complete stranger. The
interposition of paralegals and sophisticated office equipment between the lawyer and the client can insure that the lawyer remains a complete stranger. Medical
professionals have greatly depersonalized the practice of medicine, and they
have paid dearly for it in malpractice insurance premiums. Advertising is often
part of a strategy which emphasizes mass

production of "routine" services. A $195.00
divorce is not usually routine to the party,
however, and office procedures, such as
the returning of client phone calls, should
be designed with sensitivity. This is the
rule for all types of law practice, but failure
to follow it can cause particularly severe
problems in a practice limited to "routine"
legal services.

Maintaining Respect for the
Administration of Justice
Maryland has not placed many restrictions on lawyer advertising. For the most
part, the protection of the dignity of the
practice of law has been placed into the
hands of individual lawyers. In some instances, it has not been placed into very
good hands. Some legal advertising in
Maryland already approaches the "Crazy
Eddie" variety. If the public becomes imbued with the notion that the practice of
law is just another carnival, its respect for
the administration of justice will be impaired.
Lawyers must also consider the effects
of their advertising on persons who intend
to become lawyers. Many come to law
school with very high ideals and a sincere
desire to serve the public interest. Many
maintain this spirit. If they are bombarded
with huckstering about "The Game of
Law," they may decide that the law is not
the game for them.
Lawyers in Maryland have been given
great freedom with respect to advertising.
It can only be hoped that they will see it
as in their own interests to exercise that
freedom responsibly.

* John A. Lynch is an Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Baltimore School of
Law.
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